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Abstract 
Theory of mind ability has been associated with performance in interpersonal interactions 
and has been found to influence aspects such as emotion recognition, social competence, 
and social anxiety. Being able to attribute mental states to others requires attention to 
subtle communication cues such as facial expressions. Decoding and interpreting 
emotions expressed by the face, especially those with negative valence, are essential 
skills to successful social interaction. The current study explored the association between 
theory of mind skills and attentional bias to emotional faces. According to the study  
hypothesis, individuals with poor theory of mind skills showed preferential attention to 
negative faces over both non-negative faces and neutral objects. Tentative explanations 
for the findings are offered emphasizing the potential adaptive role of vigilance for threat 
as a way of allocating a limited capacity to interpret others’ mental states to obtain as 
much information as possible about potential danger in the social environment. 
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Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others 
(Premack & Woodruff, 1978). This capacity has also been referred to as mentalizing 
capacity (Morton, Frith, & Leslie, 1991), social intelligence (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997) 
and reflective-function (Fonagy & Target, 1997). The ability to perceive, understand, and 
reason about one's own and others’ behaviors in terms of mental states is a crucial skill 
for interpersonal interactions. In fact, poor theory of mind skills have been associated 
with difficulties in interpersonal interaction, in areas such as emotion recognition (e.g., 
Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, & Baron-Cohen, 2006), social competence (Bosacki & 
Astington, 1999) and generalized anxiety in social and family life (e.g., Coupland, 2001). 
Being able to attribute mental states to others requires awareness of minimal cues 
regarding non-verbal communication of emotions, such as attention to facial expressions 
(e.g., Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, & Jolliffe, 1997). Much of the work on information 
processing of facial expressions has focused on the selective processing of positive and 
negative valence emotions (Beck, 1987; Mathews & MacLeod, 1986). Emotional biases 
for facial expressions have been most frequently demonstrated by using the Stroop 
colour-naming task (Power & Dalgleish, 2008), in which participants have to name the 
colour of a word as fast as possible while ignoring its meaning. By using a modified 
version of this task, Mathews and MacLeod (1985) were the first to demonstrate that, 
relative to normal controls, anxiety-disordered patients are slower in colour-naming threat 
compared to neutral words. More recently, another type of task has been used to study 
attentional bias: the dot-probe task. In its original version, developed by MacLeod, 
Mathews, and Tata (1986), pairs of words, such as threat and neutral words, are briefly 
showed to the participant. Immediately after, a small dot probe occurs in the location just 
occupied by one of the words. The rationale for the task is that individuals are faster to 
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respond to probes that are presented in an attended, rather than unattended, region of a 
visual display (Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980). Typically, anxious individuals are 
faster to respond to probes that replace threat rather than neutral stimuli, consistent with 
the hypothesis of vigilance for threat (e.g., Broadbent & Broadbent, 1988; MacLeod et 
al., 1986). However, due to their lack of ecological validity, single words have been 
replaced with more socially relevant stimuli such as emotional facial expressions. For 
example, Bradley et al. (1998) used a modified version of MacLeod, Mathews and Tata's 
(1986) dot-probe task, including facial expressions as stimuli. 
The aim of this study is to explore the relation between theory of mind skills and 
attentional bias to emotional faces. The goal is to detect any overall tendency to direct 
attention towards or away from faces (irrespective of valence), as well as to identify more 
specific biases in the processing of negative versus non-negative emotional expressions in 
individuals with good and poor theory of mind ability.  It is hypothesized that individuals 
with poor theory of mind skills, like anxious individuals, will be more vigilant for 
negative emotional expressions when compared to individuals with good theory of mind 
skills. 
Method 
Participants 
A total of 46 (27 female) adults aged 18 to 52 years (M= 25.6, SD = 6.7) 
participated in the study. Participants were paid volunteers recruited at the University 
College London (UCL) campus by advertisement.  
Apparatus and Materials 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Baron-Cohen, et al., 2001). This test was 
conceived as a measure of how well individuals can put themselves into the mind of other 
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people and "tune in" to their mental state. It is therefore an advanced theory of mind task 
for adults designed to assess individuals' ability to make inferences about other people’s 
mental states. Participants are shown a series of 36 photographs of the eye-region of the 
face of different people, and are asked to choose which of four mental state terms best 
describes what the person in the photograph is thinking or feeling (e.g., decisive, amused, 
aghast, and bored). The photographs are all black and white and represent an equal 
number of male and female eyes, which are presented in a random order. Participants' 
responses are classified as correct or incorrect according to an ideal response set 
established on the basis of judgment consensus in a pilot study conducted by Baron-
Cohen and colleagues (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). A computer-based version of the study 
was used. This task also includes a glossary of all the mental state terms used, which 
participants are encouraged to consult before the experiment begins. If during the task 
participants are still unsure of a mental state term meaning, they can go over it by placing 
the cursor under the targeted word. The Eyes Test was found to be inversely correlated 
with the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ), a measure of autistic traits in adults of normal 
intelligence (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
            Facial Emotion Dot-Probe Task 
This computer-based task is a modified version of the dot-probe task used by 
Mansell et al. (1999) to investigate face attention in high and low socially anxious 
individuals. The task uses a sequence of pairs of photographs of facial emotional 
expressions as target stimuli and pictures of household objects as neutral stimuli. The 
facial-stimuli consist of 30 pictures of 6 different faces (3 male and 3 female Caucasian 
individuals) displaying negative (angry, fearful and sad) and non-negative (neutral and 
happy) emotional expressions. The facial images used were taken from the facial emotion 
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stimuli set developed by Matsumoto and Ekman (1988). The 30 pictures of faces were 
paired with photographs of 30 different household objects (e.g., table, clock, phone). All 
the pictures were edited to fit an upright rectangle measuring about 352 x 250 pixels and 
the face-object pairs were matched by eye for brightness and contrast. During the task, 
the pairs of pictures (face-object) are presented diagonally on the screen (for 1000ms) in 
one of two possible orientations: top right and bottom left, or top left and bottom right. 
The position of the two pictures informs participants of the two possible locations of the 
probe, which appears 500ms after the presentation of the pictures. The probe display 
consists of a letter “E” or “F” appearing in a location that corresponds to the centre of one 
of the pictures. Participants have to indicate which letter was displayed by pressing either 
the “E” key with the left forefinger or the “F” key with the right forefinger. The probe 
letter remains on the screen until participants’ response, after which the next trial begins. 
Across the 120 trials, each emotion appears in each location an equal number of times 
and the probe also appears in the same location as the target stimuli an equal number of 
times. The target stimuli are presented in a random order for each participant. The time 
elapsed between the presentation of the stimulus pictures and the key-response to the 
probe is taken as the outcome variable used to calculate attentional bias scores. 
Procedure 
The tasks were administered on desktop computers and participants were assigned 
to individual cubicles for the duration of the experiment. Participants were given the 
opportunity to read an information sheet providing a description of the computer-based 
tasks composing the experiment, as well as an explanation about the scientific rationale 
behind them. Confidentiality issues were addressed and participants were reassured that 
all the research data collected was to be kept separately from information concerning 
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personal identity. Participants were also informed that they were free to withdraw from 
the study at any time and were asked to provide written consent. After providing 
information regarding demographic characteristics (age and gender), participants began 
the experiment with the "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test", which took approximately 
10 minutes to complete. Instructions were received from a computer display. Having 
completed this task, participants were given written instructions for the "Facial Emotion 
Dot-Probe Task", which also took 10 minutes to complete. For both tasks, participants 
were encouraged to respond as quickly as possible but without sacrificing accuracy. After 
being paid the standard UCL rate for healthy volunteers, participants were debriefed and 
thanked for their participation. 
Results 
Data preparation 
Participants were divided into two groups according to their performance in the 
"Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test". Thus, individuals were assigned to either a high or 
low performance group depending on whether the number of correct answers to the test 
was in the upper or lower median range (n= 27 high performance group; n= 19 low 
performance group). For the Facial Emotion Dot-Probe Task, the data analysis was based 
on probe detection latencies (reaction times). For each participant, outliers were removed 
by excluding extremely fast (less than 200 ms) and extremely slow (greater than 1000 
ms) detection latencies because they typically indicate anticipatory responses and 
momentary inattention.  Mean probe detection latencies were calculated for each type of 
emotional face, negative (angry, fearful, sad) and non-negative (neutral and happy), and 
for each probe location (probe appearing in the location of the face vs. probe appearing in 
the location of the object). Mean errors for each face valence and probe location were 
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also calculated and subjected to a separate analysis. In order to simplify the data, 
attentional bias scores, summarising the interaction effect of location of emotional face 
with probe location, were computed. Hence, for both types of emotional faces (negative 
and non-negative) bias scores were calculated by subtracting the mean reaction time 
when the emotional face and probe were in the same position, from the mean reaction 
time when the emotional face and the probe were in different positions. The formula by 
MacLeod and Mathews (1988) was used: Bias score = 0.5 x (ELPU + EUPL - EUPU – 
ELPL (where ELPU corresponds to the detection latency for the Emotion occurring in the 
Lower area and the Probe occurring in the Upper area, and so on). Positive bias scores 
reflect selective attention towards the emotion (vigilance) and negative bias scores reflect 
attention bias away from the emotion (avoidance) (Mansell et al., 1999).  
Demographic variables 
No correlation between age and eyes test performance was found r = -.08, p > .05. 
Also, there was no association between age and biases to negative (r = .10, p > .05) or 
non-negative (r = .01, p > .05) facial expressions. Moreover, men and women did not 
differ significantly in terms of eyes test scores, t (44) = .63, p > .05, bias for negative 
expressions, t (44) = 1.9, p > .05, or bias for non-negative expressions, t (44) = .21, p > 
.05. 
Dot-probe task 
To determine whether face valence and probe location originated different error 
rates in this task, a 2 x 2 (negative / non-negative emotion vs. probe appearing in the 
location of the face / probe appearing in the location of the object) repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) of mean  errors was carried out. There was no significant 
main effect of face type, F (1, 45) = .002, p >.05 and no significant main effect of probe 
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location, F (1, 45) = .706, p >.05. Moreover, no interaction "valence x probe location" 
was found, F (1, 45) = 1.11, p >.05.  
   Another 2 x 2 (negative / non-negative emotion vs. probe appearing in the location of 
the face / probe appearing in the location of the object) repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted in order to test the effect of face type (valence) and 
probe location on probe detection latencies. The main effect of face valence was non-
significant, F (1, 45) = .172, p >.05 and the main effect of probe location was also non-
significant, F (1, 45) = 2.07, p >.05. A significant interaction "face valence x probe 
location" was found, F (1, 45) = 4.36, p <.05. Participants tended to be significantly faster 
when responding to the probe appearing in the location of the face than when responding 
to the probe appearing in the location of the object, but only for negative faces, F (1, 45) 
= 5.06, p <.05. For non-negative faces, no significant differences were observed in the 
mean probe detection latencies between the two probe locations, F (1, 45) = .051, p >.05 
Dot-probe task and "Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test". 
Error rates were examined across face valence, probe location and Eyes task 
performance. A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) of mean errors 
was carried out with one between-subjects factor (high vs. low performance in the Eyes 
task) and two within-subjects factors: face valence (negative vs. non-negative) and probe 
location (probe appearing in the location of the face vs. probe appearing in the location of 
the object). No main effects of face valence, F (1, 44) = .012, p >.05, or probe location,   
F (1, 44) = .442, p >.05, were found. Also, there were no two-way interactions "face 
valence x Eyes task performance", F (1, 44) = .79, p >.05, or "probe location x Eyes task 
performance", F (1, 44) = .86, p >.05. No significant interaction "face valence x probe 
location x Eyes task performance" was found, F (1, 44) = 1.51, p >.05. 
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 A 2 x 2 x 2 mixed design analysis of variance (ANOVA) of probe detection 
latencies data was carried out with one between-subjects factor (high vs. low performance 
in the Eyes task) and two within-subjects factors: face valence (negative vs. non-
negative) and probe location (probe appearing in the location of the face vs. probe 
appearing in the location of the object). No main effect of face valence was found 
significant, F (1, 44) = .28, p >.05; there was also no main effect of probe location, F (1, 
44) = 2.21, p >.05. The two-way interactions "face valence x eyes task performance" and 
"probe location x eyes task performance" were non-significant, F (1, 44) = .52, p >.05 
and F (1, 44) = .21, p >.05, respectively. The two-way interaction "face valence x probe 
location" remained significant, F (1, 44) = 6.16, p < .05. Also, a three-way interaction 
"face valence x probe location x eyes task performance" was found, F (1, 44) = 4.18,       
p <.05. For faces with negative valence, mean probe detection latencies were significantly 
shorter, F (1, 44) = 6.31, p <.05, when the probe appeared in the location of the face than 
when the probe appeared in the location of the object, but only for participants scoring 
low in the Eyes task (see figs.1 and 2). Participants who scored high in the Eyes task did 
not show significantly different probe detection latencies when responding to the probe 
appearing in the location of the negative face or in the location of the object, F (1, 44) = 
.74, p >.05. For faces with non-negative valence, there were no significant differences in 
mean detection latencies between the two probe locations, for both Eyes task 
performance groups, F (1, 44) = .088, p >.05 (low performance), F (1, 44) = .29, p > .05 
(high performance).  
To simplify the previous three-way interaction, a 2 x 2 mixed design analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) of attentional bias scores was conducted with one between-subjects 
factor (high vs. low performance in the Eyes task) and one within-subjects factor 
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(negative faces vs. non-negative faces). There was a significant main effect of face 
valence, F (1, 44) = 6.16, p <.05, with negative faces yielding greater bias scores 
(vigilance). An interaction "face valence x performance in the Eyes task" was also found, 
F (1, 44) = 4.18, p < .05 (see figs. 3 and 4). Participants scoring low in the Eyes task 
showed a highly significant difference in bias scores to negative vs. non-negative faces, F 
(1,44) = 8.72, p < .01. An attention bias towards negative faces (vigilance) and an 
attention bias away from non-negative faces (avoidance) were found in this group. No 
significant differences were found, F (1, 44) = .12, p >.05, between attention bias scores 
to negative and attentional bias scores to non-negative faces, among participants with 
high performance in the Eyes task. 
Discussion 
In the current study, attentional biases to negative and non-negative facial 
emotions were compared between individuals with good and poor theory of mind skills. 
Individuals with poor theory of mind skills showed preferential attention to negative 
faces over both non-negative faces and neutral objects while individuals with good theory 
of mind skills showed no such preference. Similarly, when attentional biases to faces with 
negative and non-negative valence were examined, it was found that individuals with 
poor theory of mind paid differential attention to negative vs. non-negative faces. They 
tended to look towards negative faces and away from non-negative faces. Again, 
individuals with good theory of mind skills showed no differential attention to negative 
and non-negative faces (they tend to look towards both). One possible explanation for the 
findings, in line with the study hypothesis, is that vigilance for negative emotions is 
adaptive in the presence of a poor theory of mind. In fact, given that individuals with 
poor theory of mind skills have difficulties in reasoning about other people's mental 
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states, it would be adaptive for them to selectively attend to negative faces as a way of 
obtaining information about potential danger in the social environment. In fact, in the 
absence of a good ability to differentiate subtleties in terms of facial expressions, it is 
probably preferable to use a limited theory of mind capacity to direct attention to negative 
rather than to non-negative facial stimuli, as misinterpretations of negative expressions 
(e.g. inability to differentiate anger from sadness) are more likely to have undesirable 
consequences than misinterpretations of non-negative expressions.  
An alternative explanation can be offered for the fact that only individuals with 
poor theory of mind skills showed differential attentional bias to negative and non-
negative faces. Attentional bias towards negative faces (and away from non-negative 
faces) might have interfered with theory of mind task performance. In fact, it is possible 
that some individuals in this group obtained a low performance in the Eyes task due to 
their preferential attention to negative rather than non-negative faces, which might have 
contributed to increase the number of errors in this task. In fact, it would have been 
interesting to analyse attentional bias in relation to error rates in the Eyes task in order to 
investigate, for instance, whether individuals with differential vigilance for negative 
versus non-negative faces are the ones showing greater error rates in certain states of 
mind included in the Eyes task. This would have made possible to assess whether the 
Eyes task worked as a "pure" theory of mind test or if its results were confounded by an 
attentional bias towards negative faces (and away from non-negative faces). 
Attentional bias observed in the dot-probe task suggest a general tendency for 
participants to attend more to facial emotion expressions than to neutral objects, although 
this tendency was only significant for faces with negative valence (angry, fearful, and 
sad). Faces with non-negative valence (neutral and happy) did not seem to be 
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significantly more attended to than neutral objects. Hence, it appears that individuals 
participating in this study showed a greater vigilance for negative facial expressions, 
tendency also previously found in individuals with high levels of trait anxiety (e.g., 
Mansell et al., 1999; Bradley et al., 1998). Hence, the attention "preference" for negative 
over non-negative faces found in the current study may raise the issue as to whether the 
present sample is composed of individuals with higher levels of trait anxiety than those 
expected in the general population.  
In fact, one limitation of the study was the failure to include an anxiety measure 
which could help to disentangle to effect of theory of mind ability from that of trait 
anxiety on emotional biases to emotional expressions. It is possible that individuals with 
low theory of mind skills are also the ones exhibiting higher levels of anxiety. This 
association would account for the common pattern in terms of attentional bias shared by 
individuals with high levels of trait anxiety and individuals with poor theory of mind 
skills. In fact, anxiety-related difficulties have been found to be a prevalent feature of 
disorders characterized by poor theory of mind skills, such as the autism spectrum 
disorders (e.g., Chalfant, Rapee, & Carroll, 2007). Hence, the difficulty in interpreting 
other people's thoughts and feelings would lead to a sense of unpredictability in social 
relationships and contribute to increase anxiety levels; on the other hand, high anxiety 
levels would interfere with social interactions and make it more difficult for the 
individual to make sense of other people's behaviours. Nevertheless, only the assessment 
of participants' anxiety levels would permit to clarify this issue and offer a valid 
interpretation of the observed relation between poor theory of mind skills and attentional 
bias towards negative and away from non-negative faces. It is hoped that future research 
can clarify the issues raised by this preliminary study, contributing to better understand 
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the relation between theory of mind skills and attentional bias to facial emotions over and 
above the effect of anxiety. 
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Fig.1:  Probe detection latencies for negative faces as a function of probe location and 
Eyes task  performance  (N = 46) 
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Fig.2: Mean probe detection latencies for negative faces (N = 46)	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Fig.3:  Bias scores as a function of face valence and Eyes task performance (N = 46) 
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Fig 4: Mean bias scores as a function of face valence and Eyes task performance (N = 46) 
 
 
 
	  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
